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ABSTRACT:  Although not exclusive to the Republic of Korea’s educational system, the 
pervasiveness of private tutoring, and its consequences, serve to distinguish it from systems 
operated in other countries. However, the identification of inefficiencies linked to this 
phenomenon have seen the educational authorities struggling against private tutoring since 
the 1980s. Yet, public policies have systematically failed because of the widely held belief 
that private tutoring services increase students’ academic performance. This paper 
quantifies the impact of time spent in private tutoring on the performance of students in the 
three competence fields assessed in the PISA-2006 (Programme for International Student 
Assessment). Instrumental variables are applied in a multilevel model framework in an 
attempt at addressing the endogeneity of the effects of private tutoring on academic 
performance. Our results indicate that the impact of time dedicated to private tutoring on 
academic performance depends on the particular competence: positive for mathematics, 
positive but decreasing for reading, and non-significant for science. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Private tutoring consists of a series of activities, supplementary to mainstream schooling, 
whose aim is to enhance a student’s academic performance in exchange for monetary 
payment (Bray, 2005). Although not exclusive to the Republic of Korea’s (Korea, 
hereafter) educational system 1 , the pervasiveness of private tutoring, and its 
consequences, do serve to distinguish it from systems operated in other countries. 
According to the Korean National Statistics Office, Koreans devoted 20.9 trillion won 
to private tutoring activities in 2008 (approximately 2% of its GDP), with 75% of 
primary and secondary school students receiving tutoring.  
 
The primary objective behind the hiring of private tutoring services by Korean families 
is to enhance their children’s academic performance at school and on the College 
Scholastic Achievement Test (CSAT; Suneung in Korean), so as to boost their chances 
of being admitted to one of Korea’s elite universities, the so-called “SKY2 universities”. 
Admittance into one of these universities provides better employment prospects and 
social rewards. Thus, Chae et al. (2005) report that, in 2004, 88.9% of senior officials, 
83.3% of congressmen and 82.3% of senior executives had graduated from one of 
Korea’s top 20 universities (from a total of 190), while the respective proportions 
corresponding to SKY graduates were 63.7%, 58.1% and 39.5%. In 2007, 38% of CEOs 
working in Korea’s top 100 companies and 88% of high court and supreme court judges 
were alumni of Seoul National University (SNU) as were nearly 60% of government 
ministers and almost half the members of the National Assembly. In addition, SKY 
university graduates enjoy non-economic benefits. As Lee and Brinton (1996:182) point 
out, “school background is a basis of informal social groupings that serve as an 
important source of social capital among South Koreans”. 
 
These rewards, plus the recent evolution in aggregate demand for higher education, 
have given rise to a situation of overheated competition or “education fever” in Korea. 
In 1989, 14,340 higher education students from a total of 400,000 were enrolled in SKY 
universities; in 2004, the respective figures were 14,810 and 733,000 (Chae et al. 2005). 
                                                 
1 Bray (2003 and 2005) reviews the countries in which the practice of private tutoring is widespread.  
2 Korea’s top three universities are Seoul National University (public), and Korea and Yonsei Universities 
(private). They are commonly referred to as the SKY universities, alluding to the universities’ initials. 
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 Credentialism has, therefore, split the skilled workers’ labor market and the higher 
educational system in two unequal parts.  
 
While the evidence available on the impact of private tutoring on academic performance 
is contradictory and inconclusive, the educational authorities have adopted a number of 
measures3 to tackle the proliferation of private tutoring owing to their having detected a 
number of negative side effects. The most serious of these are: 1) unreasonable  
pressure on students through endless timetables which prevent them from developing 
skills other than those included on the official academic curriculum; 2) low levels of 
motivation in schools among both pupils - the lowest in the OECD countries included in 
the PISA-2006 (Programme for International Student Assessment) - and teachers, as the 
pupils are often already familiar with the lesson being taught; and 3) the impact of the 
institutionalization of private tutoring on equality of opportunities in student access to 
higher education4, as children from higher socio-economic groups tend to consume 
more private tutoring services than children in lower socio-economic groups, as is 
shown below in Section 5.  
 
However, public policies aimed at cooling down the overheated private tutoring market 
have systematically failed due to the widely held belief that the hiring of private 
tutoring services increases students’ academic performance. In this context, Sohn et al. 
(2010) claim that the economic literature to date has failed to quantify consistently the 
impact of private tutoring in the Korean case. Hence, the principal question here 
remains unanswered: Does private tutoring enhance the academic performance of 
Korean students? And if it does, does it have the same impact on all fields of 
competence? This article seeks to shed light on these issues, quantifying the impact of 
private tutoring on the academic performance of high school students using the PISA-
2006 data. 
 
One of the main methodological concerns in analyzing the impact of private tutoring on 
academic achievement is its potential endogeneity. A child’s innate ability and the 
parents’ preferences for their children’s education might affect both academic 
                                                 
3 Seth (2002) describes the Korean educational authorities struggle against private tutoring services. 
4 Kim (2004) shows that expenditure in private tutoring in Korea is positively correlated with the level of 
education of the mother, living in a big city and the family’s socioeconomic status.  
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 achievement and the demand for private tutoring services. It is thus possible that the 
best students consume more private tutoring services than the average, with private 
tutoring services making good students even “better”. Endogeneity must therefore be 
controlled for by obtaining consistent coefficients. This paper addresses the problem of 
endogeneity through the use of instrumental variables in a multilevel framework, which 
simultaneously takes into account the nested nature of the PISA data. Our approach is 
thus innovative as it quantifies consistently the impact of private tutoring in Korea 
through a combination of both techniques. The analysis is applied to the three fields of 
competence measured by the PISA, in order to identify potentially different effects of 
private tutoring on academic achievement. Other determinants of academic achievement 
are also assessed collaterally. 
 
In contrast with most other studies analyzing the impact of private tutoring which use 
expenditure in private tutoring as their key independent variable, our paper uses the time 
spent in private tutoring activities. This enables us to examine not only the impact of 
private tutoring on academic achievement, but also the possible existence of non linear 
returns in the consumption of these services and to analyze which strategies are the 
most efficient for students to adopt.  
 
In broad terms, therefore, the originality of this paper lies in the several contributions it 
makes to the field of study. First, it undertakes a robust comparison of the impact of 
private tutoring on three different areas of competence while taking endogeneity into 
account. Second, instead of using proxies such as expenditure in private tutoring, we 
use time spent in private tutoring as an independent variable for each competence in 
order to identify non-linear effects. Third, the richness of the information provided by 
the PISA data allows us to control for a large set of variables in a multilevel framework. 
Finally, the self-study variables introduced in the regressions were previously treated so 
as to take into account the fact that some of the time spent in self-study might be 
induced by participation in private tutoring. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: a brief review of the literature on the impact of 
private tutoring on academic performance is described in Section 2. Section 3 presents 
the methodology, while Section 4 describes the data used to feed the hierarchical linear 
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 models. The results from the empirical analysis are presented and discussed in Section 5. 
Finally, Section 6 puts forward the main conclusions.   
 
2. The impact of private tutoring on academic achievement: a brief review 
 
The impact of private tutoring on academic achievement has been the subject of 
increased attention in the economic literature. The empirical evidence for Korea and 
other Asian countries, obtained using a wide range of methodologies, is, to date, 
inconclusive. While some of these analyses show a non-significant (or even negative) 
effect of private tutoring on achievement, others point to the existence of positive 
effects, at least for some of the competences assessed. The latter situation is particularly 
true of those papers that control for endogeneity. These positive effects, in turn, range 
from moderate to intense depending on the analysis.  
 
The main methodological distinction found in the literature is the introduction or 
otherwise of controls for endogeneity. Today, however, the use of endogeneity controls 
is widespread with most of the articles on the impact of private tutoring published after 
2005 including a range of strategies for that very purpose.  
 
Among the contributions not including a specific strategy to control for endogeneity, 
two articles examining the Korean case (Lee et al., 2004 and Park and Lee, 2005) report 
contradictory results. Lee et al. (2004), using an OLS model, conclude that private 
tutoring has no significant effects on the achievement of middle and high school 
students in mathematics, Korean and English. Conversely, Park and Lee, using the 
PISA-2003 data and a hierarchical linear model, find a significant positive impact of 
tutoring on mathematics achievement. Similarly, Sohn et al. (2010) report that the 
studies published in Korean are biased by endogeneity. Furthermore, they point out that  
these studies present problems as regards their definitions of ‘private tutoring’, and find 
that private expenditure or participation in private tutoring is usually adopted as a proxy. 
They cite the case of a study published in Korean by Jo and Lee (2005) as being, to date, 
the only one to use time spent in private tutoring to measure the impact of private 
tutoring on academic performance for Korea, finding a non-significant effect. 
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 Other studies conducted in Asian countries do not include a specific strategy to control 
for endogeneity. Cheo and Quah (2005), after applying a simultaneous equation model 
to middle school Singapore students, find a negative impact of tutoring on achievement. 
By contrast, Stevenson and Baker (1992), employing a logistic regression model, show 
a positive incidence of tutoring on the chances of Japanese high school students 
reaching university. The evidence provided by Ha and Harpham (2005), in a study of  
Vietnamese primary pupils, is mixed: the results of different logistic regressions 
indicate a positive incidence of tutoring on reading, but a neutral incidence on writing 
and numeracy.  
 
Contributions that do include a specific strategy to control for endogeneity typically 
adopt an instrumental variables approach. However, two key studies of the Korean case 
implement alternative techniques. Kang (2007) uses a combination of OLS and 
Propensity Score Matching to measure the impact of private tutoring on the CSAT 
results, concluding that tutoring has a slight positive effect on achievement. Sohn et al. 
(2010) apply an autoregressive cross-lagged model to panel data, aimed at establishing 
the impact of tutoring on a student’s position in the school’s overall academic ranking. 
Their empirical evidence indicates a positive incidence of tutoring; however, their 
results should be treated with some reservations, since the methodology used is limited 
by a number of factors: first, the selection of the achievement variable (position in the  
school’s achievement ranking) does not take into consideration differences between 
schools; second, the analysis does not control for family background, personal 
characteristics or school variables; and third, the authors include ‘after-school classes’, 
provided by the school itself, to their variable of ‘private tutoring’.  
 
Several recent analyses for other Asian countries also use instrumental variables in 
order to control for endogeneity and report mixed findings regarding the impact of 
private tutoring. Suryadarma et al. (2006), in a study of Indonesian fourth graders, do 
not find any significant effect of tutoring on mathematics or dictation results. By 
contrast, Dang (2007) concludes that private tutoring has a significant positive effect on 
the achievement of Vietnamese primary and secondary students. Achievement, in this 
study, is construed as the student’s position in the school academic ranking. An analysis 
by Ono (2007), applied to the ronin phenomenon (by which Japanese students receive 
an additional year of private education in order to prepare for college entrance 
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 examinations), shows how the probability of accessing an elite university is positively 
affected by this additional education. Ono’s study, however, is limited by the fact that 
only a small set of variables referring to family background, personal and school 
characteristics is controlled for in the analysis. Finally, mention should be made of 
Banerjee et al’s. (2007) empirical analysis of private tutoring in India, in which, through 
a randomized experiment, the authors conclude that tutoring has a significant positive 
effect on achievement. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
 
Data come from the “Programme for International Student Assessment” (PISA) of 2006. 
The PISA is an internationally standardized assessment administered to 15-year-olds in 
schools. The 2006 assessment was the third edition (after 2000 and 2003) and 
comprised 57 countries (30 OECD members and 27 partner economies). PISA collects 
information on the performance of students in three fields of competence (reading, 
mathematics and science). Results were initially set using a scale with an average score 
of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 for each competence. In addition, students 
complete a questionnaire about their approaches to learning and their family 
characteristics. School principals also report on their school’s characteristics and their 
management procedures. In some countries, including Korea, students also fill in a 
questionnaire on their familiarity with ICT and the students’ parents provide more 
detailed information about the household through the parent questionnaire.  
 
The Korean sample consists of 5,176 pupils. In our analysis, this number was restricted 
to 3,147 students (76.3% of the whole sample), since we only considered those in 
academic upper-secondary education (grade 10 - first year of upper-secondary education 
or inmungye godeung hakgyo). Thus, to obtain a more homogeneous group of pupils, 
we did not consider students in vocational education (jeonmungye godeung hakgyo). 
This was the case for two reasons. First, the proportion of students in vocational 
education that decide to enroll in higher education institutions (while over the last two 
decades rising markedly) remains lower than that for those studying academic upper-
secondary education (68.6% vs. 87.5%, in 2006). At the same time, vocational 
education students are more likely to enroll in junior college programs (two- or three-
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 year post-secondary programs that seek to meet the demand for technicians) than are 
academic upper-secondary education students, with competition being less intense for 
these programs. Second, the use of tutoring varies significantly between students from 
the academic and vocational track (since tutoring is mainly used to gain a university 
pace, an option chosen primarily by those in academic education). Thus, 87.1% of 
students on the academic track receive tutoring, whereas this figure falls to 39.4% for 
those on the vocational track. This different profile of academic and vocational students 
is reflected in the results on the PISA test: pupils on the academic track scored an 
average of 569.6 points in mathematics, 542.6 in science and 575.5 in reading, while the 
results for vocational education students were 475.1, 455.6 and 492.9 respectively. 
 
Korea ranks first on the PISA-2006 for reading (556 points), and second (among the 
OECD countries) for mathematics with an average of 547 points (just behind Finland). 
Korea’s ranking is lower for science (although still among the best performing 
countries), occupying seventh position among the OECD countries, with an average of 
522 points (Finland ranks first with 563 points). This higher achievement in 
mathematics and reading might be due to the fact that these subjects are particularly 
important on the CSAT and, therefore, students and their families dedicate greater 
efforts to them. 
 
The level of competence in each subject is indicated in the PISA by five plausible 
values (PV). These are not the test results but rather a representation of the range of 
abilities that a student might reasonably have, taking into consideration students’ 
answers, the difficulty of the questions and certain conditioning variables (see OECD, 
2009). To avoid any biases when estimating any given parameter, the latter has to be 
calculated for each PV. Subsequently an average value is computed.  
 
We considered several individual, household and school characteristics as our 
independent variables. Individual traits relate to student gender, age (between fifteen 
and just over sixteen years old), course level, and hours of private tutoring in 
mathematics, reading and science as well as weekly hours dedicated to self-study in 
each competence. However, part of the time devoted to self-study might be the result of 
receiving private tutoring. Therefore, an auxiliary regression was used for each 
competence in order to deduct the time spent in self-study attributable to private 
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 tutoring. For each competence, the dependent variable used in these auxiliary 
regressions was time dedicated to self-study, while time spent in private tutoring and a 
set of individual and household characteristics are to be found on the right side of the 
expression. 
 
Family traits refer to household socio-economic and cultural characteristics and 
educational resources and their use. In the case of the former, we considered mother’s 
and father’s years of schooling, whether they are active in the labor market as well as 
household occupation, defined as the highest occupation of the father or the mother. 
Occupations were classified as follows: highly-skilled white-collar, low-skilled white-
collar, highly-skilled blue-collar and low-skilled blue-collar. As for educational 
resources, information refers to whether there is a computer at home, the intensity of its 
use by the pupils, and the type of use to which it is put (as a text processor, for email or 
videogames). In addition, the number of books in the household was also taken into 
consideration. 
 
Information about the school includes its characteristics and those of its students, the 
school’s resources and educational practices. School traits indicate the type of school 
(public or private), location (population size of the municipality), size (number of 
students) and whether there are other centers near the school. We also considered the 
composition of students at each school, including the proportion of girls, average years 
of  schooling of parents, main occupation of students’ parents and their perception of 
discipline in the school. School resources are described through class size, student-
teacher ratio and ICT variables. Streaming of students, admission criteria and 
managerial autonomy were also considered in taking educational practices into account.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Table 1 shows the dependent and independent variables considered together with a 
descriptive summary. If we focus on the variables related to private tutoring, only 
16.0% of students do not attend private tutoring in mathematics. This figure increases to 
28.3% in reading and 39.4% in science. Those that attend 3-4 weekly hours of private 
tutoring form the largest group of students in mathematics (38.3% of the whole) and 
reading (32.3%). As for science, of those receiving tutoring, the largest group is made 
9
 up of those receiving 1-2 weekly hours (33.6%).  The same pattern is found when 
analyzing the self-study variables: only 9.0% of students report that they do not study 
mathematics in an autonomous fashion. The figures for reading and science are 16.0% 
and 20.3%, respectively. Interestingly, while 45.8% of students devote at least 3 hours a 
week to self-study in mathematics, this figure falls to 26.9% and 22.0% for reading and 
science.  
 
4. Econometric strategy 
 
The PISA sample is designed using a two-stage method. In the first stage, a school 
sample is randomly selected from all schools in each country providing education for 
15-year-old students. In the second stage, a random sample of students is chosen from 
each school selected in the first stage. Thus, the sample of students has a hierarchical 
structure (students are ‘nested’ in schools) but the principle of independence of 
variables between the students at each center is not maintained: students enrolled in the 
same school typically share socio-economic characteristics, which makes the average 
correlation among the variables for students within the center higher than that between 
students from different schools (Hox, 1995). The nested structure of the data suggests 
that the use of a hierarchical linear model would be an optimal strategy for estimating 
simultaneously the effects of variables belonging to different levels (Willms, 2006). 
 
The econometric model is shown in equations (1) to (4), where Yij is the expected score 
in each competence of a student ‘i’ in school ‘j’, Xkij is a vector of ‘k’ characteristics of 
student ‘i’ at school ‘j’ (or independent variables at level 1), and Zlj is a vector of ‘l’ 
characteristics of school ‘j’ (independent variables at level 2). Random effects are μj (at 
school level) and εij, (at student level). β are the estimated parameters. Equation (4) is 
obtained by introducing equations (2) and (3) into equation (1). Thus, in equation (4) a 
set of fixed effects (γ00, γ10 Xkij, γ0l Zlj) can be distinguished from a group of random 
effects (μ1j Xkij, μ0j, εij). 
 
Yij= β0j + ∑
=
n
1k
β1j Xkij+ εij  εij ~ N(0,σ2)     (1) 
β0j= γ00 + ∑
l
γ0l Zlj+ μ0j   μ0j ~ N(0,τ0)     (2) 
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 β1j= γ10 + μ1j     μ1j ~ N(0,τ1)     (3) 
 
Yij= γ00 + γ10 Xkij+γ0l Zlj+ μ1j Xkij +μ0j +εij      (4) 
 
Before running the econometric estimations, the endogeneity between the dependent 
variable and the independent ones needs to be considered. Thus, there might be 
endogeneity between the students’ scores on the PISA and private tutoring, since it 
might be assumed that families whose children are more capable of achieving higher 
results are more willing to invest more in tutoring (i.e., these students are more capable 
of getting a higher return on their families’ investment).  
 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirms the existence of endogeneity between the 
dependent variable and private tutoring in mathematics and reading but not in science 
(residuals for private tutoring in science are non-significant). This result is in 
accordance with the fact that science is given less importance than mathematics and 
reading on the CSAT and, moreover, the students in the PISA sample report that science 
is less important than the other two competences. These factors are consequent with the 
fact that in the PISA test Koreans obtain worse results in science than in the other two 
competences (see Section 3). 
 
Thus, in the hierarchical estimation (equation 4) private tutoring in mathematics and 
reading are considered through instrumental variables. The instrument used is the 
weekly number of hours spent receiving private tutoring in science. This variable is 
highly correlated with private tutoring in mathematics and reading but not with the 
dependent variable. Therefore, we estimated the effect of the instrument on the weekly 
number of hours spent receiving private tutoring in mathematics and reading (which are 
not included in the final model) together with a set of variables referring to a pupil’s 
personal and family variables as well as to those of his or her school (results are 
available upon request). These new estimations of the hours of tutoring in mathematics 
and reading were then introduced in equation (4) as explanatory variables together with 
the rest of the independent variables shown in Table 1.  
 
The introduction of time dedicated to self-study as an independent variable could also 
be a matter of concern when seeking to measure the impact of private tutoring, since 
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 part of the time spent in self-study might be the result of receiving private tutoring. 
Consequently, we used three auxiliary regressions, one for each competence, to deduct 
the effect of private tutoring on the amount of time devoted to self-study. In these 
regressions, time spent in self-study was the dependent variable, while time spent in 
private tutoring and other personal and socioeconomic characteristics were the 
independent variables. Finally, our estimations provided robust standard errors and 
multicollinearity was not observed (all VIF values being below 4). 
 
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
The results of the complete models for the three fields of competence assessed in the 
PISA are presented in Table 2. Table 3 shows the random effects of the multilevel 
regression, indicating that total variance in academic performance is mainly explained 
by differences between individuals. The independent variables are grouped according to 
the type of characteristics described, with private tutoring variables (weekly number of 
hours of private tutoring in each competence) being included in the first group 
(individual characteristics).  
 
Private tutoring does not always have a significant effect on a student’s academic 
performance in all the models: while private tutoring in mathematics and, more 
modestly, in reading, seems to enhance the student’s academic performance, tutoring in 
science appears to be ineffective. Results in Table 2 show that spending one or two 
hours per week in private tutoring in mathematics increases the expected performance 
on the PISA scale of the mathematics competence by approximately 16 points, while 
the impact of spending the same amount of time in private reading tutorials raises the 
student’s achievement in this competence by about 12.5 PISA points. By contrast, the 
effect of spending one or two hours a week in private science tutoring on the academic 
performance in this competence is statistically non-significant.  
 
Note also that the positive impact of private tutoring in mathematics and reading 
follows different trends: while the effect of private tutoring grows linearly for the 
former, it seems to describe a diminishing returns pattern for the latter. Its relatively 
large impact on academic performance and its non-decreasing effect, therefore, provide 
a large incentive for investing heavily in private tutoring in mathematics. 
12
 . 
INSERT TABLE 2 + TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
There are two possible reasons for the differences in the impact of private tutoring 
depending on the particular competence: on the one hand, repetition might play a 
greater role in acquiring competences such as mathematics; on the other hand, tutoring 
in science may be less effective reflecting student attitudes5 towards tutoring in that 
competence, given that science has a lower weight on the final score of the CSAT 
compared to language and mathematics6. It might also be the case that the competence 
in science evaluated in the PISA differs from that which Korean students have to 
demonstrate on the CSAT. 
 
It should also be stressed that the impact of private tutoring on academic performance 
does not always offset that of the number of hours of self-study time not induced by 
having received private tutoring. Table 2 shows that self-study time in mathematics and 
science has positive effects on academic performance. It increases the PISA scores by 
about 9.0 and 6.2 points per hour, respectively. By contrast, self-study in reading does 
not have a significant effect.  
 
These findings open the door to the possibility of choosing, with certain temporal and 
budgetary restrictions, the optimal strategies for each individual. In other words, the 
simple accumulation of more hours dedicated to private tutoring might not always be 
the optimal strategy for maximizing academic performance. This is clearly the case, for 
example, for students wishing to enhance their competence in science. These students 
would be better served by dedicating more time to self-study rather than receiving 
private tutoring. Nevertheless, Korean families tend to hire the standard private tutoring 
                                                 
5 This low level of interest in science is reflected not only in the lower mean scores that Korean students 
obtain in this competence in the PISA-2006 compared to their reading and mathematics scores, but also in 
the lower percentage of students that hire private tutoring services in science and in the lower interest 
index provided by PISA. By way of example, only 26.99% of high school students reported that doing 
well in science subjects was very important for them. These figures were 63.64% and 58.20% for the 
mathematics and reading competences, respectively. At the same time, only 11.72% of high school 
students strongly agreed with the statement “science is very relevant to me”. 
6 The CSAT consists of five parts: Korean language, English, a second foreign language, mathematics 
and social studies/sciences/vocational education. While the first four parts are compulsory, students can 
choose between sitting the social studies, sciences or vocational education exam. Once they have chosen, 
they must then select four subordinate subjects. 
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 “packages” offered by hagwon (academies specialized in the provision of private 
tutoring).  
 
Although certain combinations of tutoring might be more efficient than others in 
enhancing academic performance (students seeking to increase their overall 
performance through the use of the system should concentrate on hiring mathematics 
and language tutoring services, families that consume private tutoring are not acting 
irrationally, from an individual point of view. Potential marginal increases in academic 
performance mean Korean families will consume large amounts of private tutoring 
services in order to maximize their children’s chances of being admitted to a SKY 
university. In a hypercompetitive and credentialist society such as Korea’s, even the 
false belief that a certain strategy can boost academic performance (such as investing in 
private tutoring in science) will induce families to adopt it. This situation call into 
question the social efficiency of private tutoring.  
 
Measuring the social efficiency of expenditure on private tutoring would require the 
conversion of all the costs and benefits linked to private tutoring to monetary units. This 
would involve translating increases in academic performance (in terms of the PISA and 
CSAT scores, for example) into GDP points, a task that falls beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, even if the positive effects of private tutoring measured in terms of 
GDP exceeded the effective costs (approximately 2% of GDP in 2008), it would not be 
easy to determine whether these benefits offset the negative externalities and the 
opportunity costs described in Section 1. If the individual benefits associated with the 
consumption of private tutoring did not offset their social costs, Korea would be trapped 
in a prisoner’s dilemma. Further research would be needed to test this hypothesis. 
 
Our results also have implications for social equality. If private tutoring in mathematics 
and reading have a positive effect on academic performance and it is the wealthier 
families that hire a larger number of private tutors (or better quality tutors), then the 
consumption of private tutoring will reduce the equality of opportunity for students 
seeking admission to higher education. Our analysis of the relationship between the 
time spent in private tutoring in the three fields of competence with total household 
income (the PISA-2006 dataset does not permit the calculation of income per individual 
household member) and the wealth and socioeconomic status indices provided by the 
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 PISA (Table 4) shows that the amount of time spent in private tutoring increases as the 
socioeconomic status and wealth of the household rise. This finding is consistent with 
results reported in recent studies (Jung and Lee, 2010 and Kim and Lee, 2010).  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
Although a lower consumption of private tutoring could be offset in the case of 
mathematics and science by devoting more time to self-study, it should be borne in 
mind that students from low-income families are also those that are more likely to have 
fewer educational resources at home. Table 2 shows that the impact on academic 
performance of a household’s educational resources is, in the Korean case, more 
important than that of household characteristics. This result indicates that the 
socioeconomic characteristics of a family find an indirect channel of influencing 
academic performance through the consumption of private tutoring. This should raise 
the concerns of the educational authorities as it could mean, in the long run, an increase 
in intergenerational educational inequalities. 
 
With a wide range of policies aimed at reducing the consumption of private tutoring 
having failed, the Korean educational authorities find themselves at a crossroads. A 
blanket ban on private tutoring (implemented in 1980) failed and was declared 
unconstitutional in 2000. The public provision of services, in theory aimed at 
substituting private tutoring, including a TV educational scaffolding service (introduced 
in 1990) and, more recently, internet websites, has been unable to dampen the private 
tutoring market either. Modifying the admissions system to higher education has also 
proved to be ineffective (since the introduction of test essays by each university as a 
complementary criterion to the CSAT has led, as Lee (2010) reports, to the appearance 
of hagwon specialized in the preparation of such essays7). Therefore, there appear to be 
two main options left to the Korean educational authorities: on the one hand, they could 
seek to minimize the negative social consequences of the excessive consumption of 
private tutoring by regulating this private market8; on the other hand, the Korean public 
sector could go a step further in its sequential education expansion policy (Choi, 2009), 
                                                 
7 Nevertheless, in recent times, the number of faculties using the CSAT scores as their sole criteria for 
admission rose from 11 in 2008 to 81 in 2010 (JoongAng Daily, 2009). 
8 For example, since 2008 hagwon have had to close at 10pm, as before it was common practice to remain 
open until the early hours. 
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 enhancing the quality of the universities that Korean society currently perceives as non-
elite centers and increasing the number of places offered by public universities. Yet, 
turning this situation around is not easy, as private tutoring is deeply rooted in the 
country’s credentialism and social values. 
 
To conclude, we end this section by sounding a note of warning. We studied the impact 
of private tutoring on the academic performance of 15-year-old students in the PISA. 
However, the extent to which these effects can be considered to persist to the age of 17, 
when Korean students sit their CSAT exam, is uncertain. Second, this paper does not 
include variables related to the quality of private tutoring, as the PISA data does not 
provide information about the different types of private tutoring received by the 
students.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Korean students grow up in a credentialist society where overheated competition leads 
families to adopt strategies that might enhance their children’s chances of graduating 
from an elite university. The most frequently adopted of these strategies is the 
consumption of private tutoring services, based on the widely held belief that such 
services can improve students’ academic performance. However, any specific evidence 
of the actual impact of private tutoring on academic performance in Korea is scarce. 
This paper has sought to fill this gap by undertaking a robust estimation of the effects of 
private tutoring on the three fields of competence assessed in PISA-2006. 
 
The effects of private tutoring on academic performance have proved complex. Thus, 
the impact on academic achievement in mathematics is positive and increases linearly. 
In the reading competence, private tutoring has a positive but decreasing effect on the 
PISA-2006 reading scores, but investing in science tutoring appears not to be an 
efficient strategy for raising performance. These different effects seem to be related to 
both the nature of the competence assessed and the structure of the CSAT examination. 
For instance, an analysis of the PISA-2006 data shows that Korean students tend to take 
the mathematics competence more seriously than they do that of the sciences, reflecting 
in all likelihood the weight of both competences on the CSAT. At the same time, the 
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 effects of time dedicated to self-study also vary among the competences assessed, the 
greatest impact being recorded for time dedicated to mathematics. 
 
These findings have several implications. First, the educational investment decisions of 
Korean families seem to be conditioned by the CSAT structure. Second, from an 
individual point of view, Korean families overinvest in certain kinds of private tutoring 
because of a lack of information about the actual benefits of such investment. Korean 
students, especially those attending private tutoring in the sciences, might well be 
assuming a high opportunity cost in the form of time not devoted to self-study. Third, 
our results also have equity implications. Consuming private tutoring might not always 
be the best strategy for increasing academic performance but, in a hypercompetitive 
environment, marginal gains may make a difference on the CSAT and few families are 
willing to take the risk of reducing their children’s chances of being admitted to a SKY 
university. Considering that families with high income levels invest more heavily in 
private tutoring, it may represent a source of inequality in student access to higher 
education. 
 
Finally, two issues concerning the impact of private tutoring on academic performance 
in Korea remain unexplained. First, it is plausible that quality might be as important as 
quantity in determining the impact of private tutoring on academic performance. 
Second, although this paper shows that some types of private tutoring are beneficial for 
individuals, the situation might well be socially inefficient. However, this question can 
only be addressed by translating increases in the PISA or CSAT scores and the 
externalities of private tutoring into GDP points.  
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 Table 1. Data description. 
 N Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Individual characteristics 1: Age and gender      
WOMEN (gender dummy: 1 if female) 3,947 0 1 0.500 0.500 
AGE (student’s age, in years) 3,947 15.33 16.25 15.77 0.29 
YEAR9 (3rd year of middle school) 3,947 0 1 0.01 0.12 
YEAR10 (1st year of high school) 3,947 0 1 0.98 0.15 
YEAR 11 (2nd year of high school) 3,947 0 1 0.01 0.09 
Individual characteristics 2: Self-study and private tutoring      
TUTMA0 (0 weekly hours in private tutoring - maths) 3,902 0 7 0.16 0.37 
TUTMA1 (1-2 weekly hours in private tutoring - maths) 3,902 0 1 0.21 0.41 
TUTMA2 (3-4 weekly hours in private tutoring - maths) 3,902 0 1 0.38 0.49 
TUTMA3 (5+ weekly hours in private tutoring - maths) 3,902 0 1 0.25 0.43 
TUTRE0 (0 weekly hours in private tutoring - reading) 3,905 0 1 0.28 0.45 
TUTRE1 (1-2 weekly hours in private tutoring - reading) 3,905 0 1 0.31 0.46 
TUTRE2 (3-4 weekly hours in private tutoring - reading) 3,905 0 1 0.32 0.47 
TUTRE3 (5+ weekly hours in private tutoring - reading) 3,905 0 1 0.09 0.28 
TUTSC0 (0 weekly hours in private tutoring - science) 3,905 0 1 0.39 0.49 
TUTSC1 (1-2 weekly hours in private tutoring - science) 3,905 0 1 0.33 0.47 
TUTSC2 (3-4 weekly hours in private tutoring - science) 3,905 0 1 0.24 0.43 
TUTSC3 (5+ weekly hours in private tutoring - science) 3,905 0 1 0.04 0.20 
SSTUDMA(weekly hours in self study - maths) 3,899 0 7 2.71 2.09 
SSTUDRE (weekly hours in self study - reading) 3,907 0 7 1.61 1.50 
SSTUDSC (weekly hours in self study - science) 3,902 0 7 1.40 1.39 
Household 1. Socio-economic and cultural characteristics       
MOTSCY (years of schooling: mother) 3,910 3 16 12.53 2.53 
FATSCY (years of schooling: father) 3,895 3 16 13.34 2.64 
MOTNACT (dummy: 1 if mother economically non-active) 3,801 0 1 0.26 0.44 
FATNACT (dummy: 1 if father economically non-active) 3,876 0 1 0.01 0.08 
QWHITEC (white collar, highly-skilled household) 3,913 0 1 0.71 0.45 
NQWHITEC (white collar low-skilled household) 3,913 0 1 0.16 0.36 
QBLUEC (blue collar highly-skilled household) 3,913 0 1 0.08 0.28 
NQBLUEQ (blue collar low-skilled household) 3,913 0 1 0.04 0.21 
Household 2. Educational resources and their use      
NCOMPU (dummy: 1 if no computer at home) 3,943 0 1 0.02 0.14 
25BOOKS (0-25 books at home) 3,942 0 1 0.10 0.30 
100BOOKS (26-100 books at home) 3,942 0 1 0.31 0.46 
200BOOKS (101-200 books at home) 3,942 0 1 0.27 0.44 
500BOOKS (over 200 books at home) 3,942 0 1 0.33 0.47 
REGUSECO (student uses computers frequently) 3,934 0 1 0.93 0.25 
OCUSECO (student uses computers occasionally) 3,934 0 1 0.05 0.23 
NUSECO (student never uses computers) 3,934 0 1 0.11 0.10 
REGWRITE (student uses text processors frequently) 3,917 0 1 0.30 0.46 
OCWRITE (student uses text processors occasionally) 3,917 0 1 0.63 0.48 
NWRITE (student never uses text processors) 3,197 0 1 0.07 0.26 
REGEMAIL (student uses email frequently) 3,921 0 1 0.63 0.48 
OCEMAIL (student uses email occasionally) 3,921 0 1 0.25 0.43 
NEMAIL (student never uses email) 3,921 0 1 0.11 0.32 
REGVIDEO (student plays videogames frequently) 3,916 0 1 0.49 0.50 
OCVIDEO (student plays videogames occasionally) 3,916 0 1 0.29 0.46 
NVIDEO (student never plays videogames) 3,916 0 1 0.21 0.41 
School1. School characteristics      
PUBLIC (public school) 3,947 0 1 0.54 0.50 
PRIVPUBF (private school; publicly funded) 3,947 0 1 0.27 0.44 
PRIVATE (private independent school) 3,947 0 1 0.19 0.39 
CITYSIZ1 (population > 1,000,000) 3,947 0 1 0.48 0.50 
CITYSIZ1 (population 100,000-1,000,000) 3,947 0 1 0.37 0.48 
CITYSIZ3 (population < 100,000) 3,947 0 1 0.14 0.35 
OTHERSCH (maximum 2 centers near the school) 3,913 0 1 0.26 0.44 
SCHSIZE (school size) 3,947 68 2,053 1,154.43 402.06 
School 2. Student characteristics      
PCGIRLS (proportion of girls at school) 3,947 0 1 0.50 0.37 
SCHEDU (average years of schooling of parents) 3,947 10.88 15.83 13.65 0.92 
SCHQWHI (white collar, high-skilled, mode) 3,947 0 1 0.98 0.12 
SCHQBLU (blue collar, high-skilled, mode) 3,947 0 1 0.02 0.12 
DISCPROB (dummy: 1 if parents think there are discipline problems at 
school) 3,861 0 1 0.20 0.40 
School 3. School resources      
CLSSIZ (class size) 3,947 23 43 33.62 3.59 
STRATIO (student-teacher ratio) 3,947 6.11 27.78 16.73 2.25 
FTEACH (proportion of full-time teachers) 3,947 0.73 1 0.97 0.05 
IRATCO (computers for instruction/ school size) 3,774 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.64 
20
 School 4. Educational practices      
STREB (streaming between classes)  3,574 0 1 0.17 0.37 
STREW (streaming within classes) 3,325 0 1 0.35 0.48 
RESID (residence is used as admission criterion) 3,844 0 1 0.40 0.49 
SELEC (academic records or recommendations are used as admission 
criterion) 3,831 0 1 0.66 0.47 
RELIG (religious or philosophical issues are used as admission criterion) 3,831 0 1 0.10 0.30 
AUTCONT (autonomy for selecting teachers for hire) 3,947 0 1 0.37 0.48 
AUTBUDG (budgetary autonomy) 3,947 0 1 0.71 0.46 
AUTEXT (autonomy for selecting textbooks) 3,947 0 1 0.96 0.19 
AUTCONTE (autonomy for selecting contents) 3,947 0 1 0.92 0.28 
AUTOCU (autonomy for modifying the curriculum) 3,947 0 1 0.81 0.39 
21
 Table 2. Determinants of academic performance in Korea: fixed effects with robust 
standard errors of multilevel models in PISA-2006. 
 Mathematics Reading Science 
Constant 397.06*** (2.93) 482.82*** (3.49) 319.05** (2.31) 
    
Individual characteristics 1: Age and gender    
Female -17.53** (-2.39) 31.51*** (5.65) -8.58 (-1.18) 
Age -8.38 (-1.18) -6.38 (-0.89) 4.32 (0.70) 
Enrolled in year 9 -57.84*** (-3.20) -75.84*** (-4.20) -64.75*** (-4.03) 
Enrolled in year 11 41.72** (2.33) 38.94** (2.10) 30.22*** (1.86) 
Individual characteristics 2: Self-study and private tutoring    
Weekly hours in self study in competence 8.99*** (5.06) 3.15 (1.30) 6.23** (2.45) 
1-2 weekly hours in private tutoring in competence 16.40* (1.93) 12.48** (1.99) 6.54 (0.88) 
3-4 weekly hours in private tutoring in competence 23.54** (1.98) 15.42** (1.96) 11.16 (1.41) 
5+ weekly hours in private tutoring in competence 36.28*** (2.89) 25.26 (1.18) 11.68 (1.11) 
    
Household 1. Socio-economic and cultural characteristics    
Mother’s years of schooling -0.36 (-0.26) -0.49 (-0.33) -0.14 (-0.09) 
Father’s years of schooling -0.93 (-1.01) -2.50** (-2.34) -0.95 (-0.98) 
Mother economically non-active -10.61 (-1.56) -7.26 (-1.28) -10.45* (-1.87) 
Father economically non-active -13.19 (-0.72) -15.67 (-0.90) -0.21 (-0.01) 
White collar low-skilled household -6.64 (-0.90) -14.85** (-2.53) -13.88** (-2.25) 
Blue collar highly-skilled household -4.30 (-0.45) -13.03 (-1.32) -5.33 (-0.51) 
Blue collar low-skilled household 9.58 (1.38) -5.56 (-0.49) -6.87 (-0.53) 
Household 2. Educational resources and their use    
Household without computer -44.43** (-2.18) -42.79** (-2.19) -40.25*** (-3.40) 
26 to 100 books at home 18.66** (2.51) 20.71*** (3.15) 14.29* (1.82) 
101 to 200 books at home  28.54*** (3.14) 27.78*** (3.45) 29.51*** (2.92) 
Over 200 books at home 45.36*** (4.96) 44.93*** (4.23) 39.03*** (3.64) 
Student uses computers occasionally -2.72 (-0.24) 0.86 (0.06) 5.77 (0.47) 
Student never uses computers 16.16 (0.59) 28.56 (1.11) 33.89 (1.47) 
Student uses text processors occasionally 17.39** (1.99) 11.22 (1.47) 12.00 (1.55) 
Student never uses text processors  -12.22 (-1.03) -26.53** (-2.57) -32.65*** (-2.81) 
Student uses email occasionally 8.39* (1.71) 10.13** (2.26) 9.70 (2.37) 
Student never uses email -10.20 (0.27) -10.17 (-1.40) -6.37 (-0.82) 
Student plays videogames occasionally 11.45 (1.32) 7.09 (0.97) 13.89* (1.84) 
Student never plays videogames -2.57 (-0.26) -1.77 (-0.23) 0.53 (0.07) 
    
School 1. School characteristics    
Private publicly funded school -30.83*** (-3.13) -26.12** (-2.51) -34.92*** (-2.81) 
Private independent school -3.84 (-0.36) -3.73 (-0.35) -11.21 (-0.93) 
Medium size city: population from 100,000 to 1,000,000 4.89 (0.69) 7.07 (0.94) 2.03 (0.29) 
Small size city: population < 100,000 -6.33 (-0.59) -2.24 (-0.21) -3.29 (-0.31) 
School size 0.00 (0.28) -0.01 (-0.48) -0.00 (-0.23) 
Maximum two other centers near the school 11.47 (1.54) 10.75 (1.25) 6.04 (0.77) 
School 2. Student characteristics    
Proportion of girls at school  26.24*** (2.91) 17.29* (1.94) 26.07** (2.47) 
Average years of schooling of parents 20.97*** (3.84) 20.80*** (4.12) 19.29*** (3.79) 
Blue collar highly-skilled school 2.63 (0.15) 6.37 (0.30) 6.67 (0.28) 
Discipline problems -16.04** (-2.60) -8.40 (-1.40) -9.30 (-1.60) 
School 3. School resources    
Class size -2.58* (-1.84) -2.59* (-1.79) -2.90* (-1.87) 
Student-teacher ratio -1.34 (-0.70) 0.79 (0.42) 0.53 (0.28) 
Proportion of part-time teachers 83.14 (0.20) -6.01 (-0.09) -32.57 (-0.44) 
Computers for instruction per student -5.17 (-0.12) -78.08 (0.17) -28.49 (-0.54) 
School 4. Educational practices    
Streaming within classes -9.99 (-1.20) -14.29 (-1.59) -8.28 (-1.09) 
Streaming between classes 5.69 (0.76) -11.32 (0.13) 1.63 (0.22) 
Admission criterion: residence -10.69* (-1.92) -5.47 (-0.90) -4.09 (-0.67) 
Admission criteria: Acad. records and recommendations  19.08*** (3.03) 9.23 (1.27) 15.65** (2.47) 
Admission criteria: Religious or philosophical issues 2.42 (0.29) 3.40 (0.37) 11.79 (1.17) 
Autonomy for selecting teachers for hire 7.23 (0.77) 16.31* (1.73) 12.35 (1.12) 
Budgetary autonomy -21.64*** (-2.85) -23.09*** (-2.94) -26.00*** (-3.51) 
Autonomy for selecting textbooks -10.65 (14.83) -15.95 (-1.08) -7.29 (-0.56) 
Autonomy for selecting contents 8.59 (6.59) 7.25 (0.80) -7.22 (0.71) 
Autonomy for modifying the curriculum -1.88 (-0.27) 5.17 (0.72) 7.77 (1.10) 
    
Observations 3.947 3.947 3.947 
 
Note: 1. t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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 Table 3. Multilevel regression: Random effects. 
 Mathematics Reading Science 
Variances Null model 
Complete 
model 
Null 
model 
Complete 
model 
Null 
model 
Complete 
model 
Schools (uj) 2,851.37 485.88 2,254.30 556.53 2,137.68 539.73 
Individuals (εij) 4,472.83 3,832.16 4,018.13 3,547.23 4,454.48 4,055.12 
Total (uj + εij) 7,324.20 4,318.04 6,272.43 4,103.76 6,592.16 4,594.85 
% of the total variance explained by the 
variables   41.0%  34.6%  30.3% 
% of the level 1 (students) variance 
explained by the variables  14.3%  11.7%  9.0% 
% of the level 2 (schools) variance 
explained by the variables  83.0%  75.3%  74.6% 
 
  
 
Relationship between consumption of private tutoring in mathematics and the 
household’s socioeconomic status and wealth indices as provided by PISA-2006. 
 Household’s 
socioeconomic status index Household’s wealth index 
0 weekly hours -0.35 -0.52 
0-2 weekly hours -0.10 -0.36 
2-4 weekly hours 0.12 -0.20 
More than 4 weekly hours 0.32 -0.04 
Mean -0.15 -0.29 
 
Note: More positive (or less negative) values indicate higher socioeconomic status and wealthier households, respectively. 
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